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In November 1993, theAlbuquerque Tribune
published a series ofarticles about people
whose lives had been devastated because they
had been injected with plutonium-without
their knowledge orconsent-by medical
researchers working for the U.S. government.
When Secretary ofEnergy-designate Hazel
O'Leary read about these experiments she was
shocked. On 15 January 1994, immediately
upon assuming office as President, William
Clinton responded to O'Leary's publicly
expressed outrage by creating an Advisory
Committee on Human Radiation Experiments.
This committee was charged with "answer[ing]
three fundamental questions": (1) What was
the federal government's role in human
radiation experiments conducted from 1944 to
1974? (2) By what standards should the ethics
ofthese experiments be evaluated? (3) What
lessons learned from studying past and present
research standards and practices should be
applied to the future? (p. xxiv).
What did the Advisory Committee find?
Findings 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20
address Question (1) and document that
between 1944 and 1974 the U.S. government
and its scientists participated in deceptive and
often harmful experiments on military
personnel, on unsuspecting communities, on
individual patients (adults and children), and
even on members ofthe general public-often
with little adequate follow up or record-
keeping. These experiments laid the foundation
for nuclear medicine (including radiation
therapy for the treatment ofcancer) and set the
safety standards for both peaceful and military
uses of atomic energy, but they often damaged
and destroyed the lives ofthose who
unwittingly became research subjects. For the
most part, the researchers neither informed
these people that they were being subjected to
potentially harmful doses ofradiation, nor
asked them whether they wished to volunteer
to serve as human guinea pigs.
Does anyone owe these victims ofscience
an apology? Is any one liable for compensating
them for the harm that they suffered at the
hands ofphysicians and scientists? The
Advisory Committee (in addressing Question
2) argues that the government and its scientists
are both responsible and financially liable (thus
opening the way forthe victims to receive
compensation). It notes "that as early as 1944
it was conventional for physicians and other
biomedical scientists to obtain consent for
human subjects ofresearch ... [unless] the
research was intended to offer a prospect of
medical benefit [to the research subject]"
(Finding 10, p. 502). Therefore the government
and its scientists are "morally responsible" for
unconsented non-therapeutic research (Finding
1la, p. 502). The Advisory Conmittee also
found-and this is more controversial-that
even though, until 1974, there was no moral
consensus requiring informed consent for
potentially "therapeutic" experiments, none the
less "government officials and investigators are
blameworthy for not having had policies and
practices.in place to protect the rights and
interests ofhuman subjects who were used in
research [that] might provide a direct medical
benefit to subjects" albeit "they are less
blameworthy for not having had such
protections and policies" (Finding llc, pp.
503-4). It is important to appreciate that with
respect to "therapeutic experiments" the
Advisory Committee is contending that even
though it was customary to exempt research
intended for the benefit ofthe subjects from
any informed consent requirement, the
government and its employees are none the
less blameworthy because they did not protect
their subjects better.
How, one might ask, can the government and
the research community be held accountable
(and legally liable) forviolating a rule thathad
yet to be formulated? How can actions
committed in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s be
judged by standards that were first agreed upon
in the so-called bioethics revolution ofthe
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1970s? Because, the Committee answers in a
carefully thought out reply, the government and
the researchers it supported had a moral,
responsibility forprotecting both the public and
the subjects ofscientific research. Ifthey failed
to live up to this responsibility, ifthey failed to
develop adequate standards, they ought to pay
the price, not their innocent victims.
One mightcharge thatthe Advisory
Committee is being unreasonable inblaming
people foractions that had yetto be proscribed as
immoral. The Committee has an interesting
reply-areply that, moreover, demonstrates the
importance ofcareful research into thehistory of
medical ethics. As ithappens, the so-called
"therapeutic exemption" to therequirementof
informed consentwas notinitially "the done
thing"; ittook some deliberate doing to make it
"thedone thing". There was no "therapeutic
exemption" in theNuremberg Tribunal's 1947
Code ofEthics forResearch on Humans; that
code categorically prohibitedresearch onhumans
withouttheirinformed voluntary consent
Moreover, the Atomic Energy Commission and
theU.S. military accepted theNuremberg Code
without seeldng to introduce athrpeutic
exemption. In 1954the Army Office ofthe
Surgeon Generalreissued the Nuremberg Code,
with its stringentrequirements ofinformed
consent, as the official nulereguiating all military
and allmilitary-funded research on human
subjects; however, the rsearchcommunity
rebelled. On 8 June 1962, at ameeting ofthe
Board ofAdministrators ofHarvard Medical
School the medicalfaculty officiallyrejected the
Surgeon General's 1954regulation as overly-
stringent. The Harvard Board decided to accept
instead a setofprinciples draftedby DrHenry
Beecher. These principles emphasizedthatin
therapeutic contexts obtaining informed consent
maybe "folly . .. difficult . .. tothepointof
impossible', therapy required a"special
relationship oftrustbetween subject orpatient
andinvestigator". On 12July 1962,
representatives fromHarvard metthe Army
SurgeonGenerl. Harvard, being Harvard, won.
The researchers' trumph was total: the U.S.
Surgeon General's Officepenritted a
"therapeutic exemption" which set theprecedent
foraninternationaldtapeutic exemption
(Medical Research Council ofBritain, 1963;
World Health Organization, Declaration of
Helsinki 1964, etc.). Thus the research
community andtheU.S. government deliberately
chose to loosen the strictprovisions ofthe
Nuremberg Code. They thereby made licitthe
tragic experiments related by the Advisory
Committee; and, to reiterate the Committee's
position, they are thus responsible for
compensating the victims oftheirill-chosen
policy.
The third question that the Advisory
Committee addressed concerns the "lessons to
be learned from studying the past". The pre-
eminent lesson the Committee took away from
its analysis was the importance ofunderstanding
the history ofmedical ethics-including the
failings ofpast moral policies and practices. We
have aresponsibility forteaching the history of
medical ethics, they argue, iffor no otherreason
than to ensure that no future generation of
medical researchers will, in theirignorance of
the past, again attempt tojettison the safeguards
thatpresently protect human research subjects.
Some historians have recently announced, rather
proudly, that they have found "the recent rise of
medical ethics" eminently "resistible". In
contrast, the historians who served on the
Advisory Committee found a commendable
synergy between bioethics and the history of
medicine; they demonstrate that historically
unexamined moral principles (such as the
"therapeutic exemption") may not be worth
living by. Historians sceptical ofthe importance
ofthe history ofmedical ethics ought to read
this book-theyjust might change their mind.
Everyone interested in the history ofmedicine at
the birth ofthe atomic age, or in the history of
medical science generally, ought to read this
superbly-organized, well-written and well-
documented volume. The book is such agood
read that one often forgets that it is a
government report. Ruth Faden and her
associates are to be congratulated.
Robert Baker,
Union College, New York; Center for
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